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Abstract 
This paper examines whether exporting activity matters for firm's price cost margins. \ The
recent literature on exporting and productivity shows that exporters on average are more
efficient than non-exporters. If that is the case we may also expect them to have different mark-
ups. We investigate this issue using company level data for UK manufacturing industries. The
measurement of mark-ups follows the recent approach presented by Roeger (1995). Our results
show that, on average, exporters have higher mark-ups than non-exporters. We also distinguish
sectors into homogeneous and differentiated goods producing. This distinction shows that we
only find higher mark-ups for exporters in differentiated goods sectors, not in homogeneous
sectors.
JEL classification: F1, L1, L6
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The issue of whether firms that export have productivity advantages over non-exporters has
been the subject of much debate recently; evidence showing such a productivity advantage is
plentiful.  A related question is whether this apparent productivity advantage also has an effect
on the competitiveness of exporters compared to non-exporters.  To be more precise, are
exporters that have an apparent productivity advantage also able to sustain higher price cost
margins than non-exporters?  This question, which does not appear to have been addressed in
the existing literature, is the topic of this paper.
If markets are less than perfectly competitive firms are able to charge prices higher than
marginal cost, i.e. their mark-up defined as the ratio of price over marginal cost will be greater
than one.  Much has been written, both theoretically and empirically, about the effect of import
competition on mark-ups.  These studies generally find that increases in imports, or reductions
in trade protection, are related with decreasing mark-ups.  This paper examines the trade -
competition link from a slightly different point of view.  We investigate empirically whether
exporting activity is related to firms' price cost margins.
Bernard et al. (2003) have recently provided a model based on imperfect competition that links
firm level efficiency, firm specific mark-ups and exporting activity of a firm in a consistent
way.  They show that more efficient producers have a cost advantage over their competitors, set
higher mark-ups and have higher levels of measured productivity.  Since more efficient
producers are also likely to have more efficient rivals, they are likely to charge lower prices,
sell more on the domestic market and also beat rivals on export markets, i.e., they are more
likely to become exporters.  
This paper sets out to analyse the relationship between exporting activity and price cost margins
empirically using firm level panel data for UK manufacturing industries for the period 1990 –
1996.  We contribute to the literature in a number of other ways.  While there is a large
literature studying the effect of import competition on PCMs and the link between exporting
and productivity, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper that looks at the
implications of exporting for mark-ups of exporters compared to non-exporters.  Furthermore,
our paper is the first that we are aware of that calculates price-cost margins using the approach
developed by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) for the UK using firm level panel data.Our econometric results show that, on average, exporters have higher mark-ups than non-
exporters.  We also distinguish sectors into homogeneous and differentiated goods producing.
This distinction shows that we only find higher mark-ups for exporters in differentiated goods
sectors, not in homogeneous sectors.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h ei s s u eo fw h e t h e rﬁrms that export have productivity advantages over
non-exporters has been the subject of much research and debate recently.
Evidence showing such a productivity advantage is plentiful, see, for example,
the papers by Clerides et al. (1998) for Colombia, Mexico and Morocco,
Bernard and Jensen (1999) for the US, Girma et al. (2003) for the UK and
Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2002) for a number of East Asian countries.1 A
related question that comes to mind is whether this apparent productivity
advantage also has an eﬀect on the competitiveness of exporters compared
to non-exporters. To be more precise, are exporters that have an apparent
productivity advantage also able to sustain higher price cost margins than
non-exporters? This question, which does not appear to have been addressed
in the existing literature, is the topic of this paper.
If markets are less than perfectly competitive ﬁrms are able to charge
prices higher than marginal cost, i.e., their mark-up deﬁned as the ratio of
price over marginal cost (p/mc) will be greater than one. The evidence that
mark-ups exist is widespread (e.g., Hall, 1988, Roeger, 1995, Konings et al.,
2001) and is taken as evidence that competition is less than perfect. Much
has been written about the eﬀect of import competition on mark-ups and
this literature has recently been reviewed by Tybout (2001). Trade theoretic
models (e.g., Krugman, 1979, Brander, 1981) show that a move from autarky
to free trade will lead to increases in output through imports, resulting in
stronger competition and hence reductions in the mark-up. Empirical studies
that look at the link between import competition and mark-ups are provided
by, for example, Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Katics and Petersen
(1994), Krishna and Mitra (1998) and Co (2001). These studies generally
ﬁnd that increases in imports, or reductions in trade protection, are related
with decreasing mark-ups.
This paper examines the trade - competition link from a slightly diﬀer-
ent point of view. We investigate empirically whether exporting activity is
related to ﬁrms’ price cost margins.
Bernard et al. (2003) have recently provided a model based on imper-
fect competition that links ﬁrm level eﬃciency, ﬁrm speciﬁc mark-ups and
exporting activity of a ﬁrm in a consistent way. In imperfectly competi-
1Much of the recent debate focusses on whether ﬁrms learn through exporting (e.g.,
Girma et al. 2003a) or whether more productive ﬁrms self select into exporting (e.g.,
Bernard and Jensen, 1999 and Clerides et al. 1998).
2tive markets, ﬁrms charge a price equal to a mark-up over marginal cost,
pi = mi(c/zi), where mi is the ﬁrm speciﬁcm a r k - u p ,c is the cost of inputs
and zi is a measure of eﬃciency of ﬁrm i. Then, measured productivity of
ﬁrm i is pizi = miw which varies if mi varies across ﬁrms.
Their simple model yields two testable predictions. First, since more
eﬃcient producers are also likely to have more eﬃcient rivals, they are likely
to charge lower prices, sell more on the domestic market and also beat rivals
on export markets, i.e., they are more likely to become exporters.2 As pointed
out above, a large literature analyses this issue, mostly conﬁrming the theory.
S e c o n d ,i nam o d e lw i t hB e r t r a n dc o m p e t i t i o n ,m o r ee ﬃcient producers have
a cost advantage over their competitors, set higher mark-ups and have higher
levels of measured productivity. Hence, more eﬃcient producers set higher
mark-ups and are also more likely to become exporters.
Our paper tests the implication that there is a relationship between ﬁrms
price cost margins and export intensity empirically, using a large sample of
ﬁrms from UK manufacturing sector. We contribute to the literature in a
number of other ways. As pointed out above, while there is a large literature
studying the eﬀect of import competition on PCMs and the link between
exporting and productivity, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst
paper that looks at the implications of exporting for mark-ups of exporters
compared to non-exporters. Furthermore, our paper is the ﬁr s tt h a tw ea r e
aware of that calculates price-cost margins using the approach developed by
Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) for the UK using ﬁrm level panel data.3
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
introduces the methodology used to estimate PCMs, following the approach
proposed by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). Section 3 describes our ﬁrm level
dataset. The results are divided in two sub-sections: Section 4.1 provides
estimates of average PCMs, in manufacturing industry as a whole and in
mode disaggregated subsets, while Section 4.2 analyses more precisely the
eﬀect of exporting. Section 5 concludes.
2The theoretical result that more eﬃcient ﬁrms are more likely to become exporters
is similar to Melitz (2003). However, Melitz’s paper assumes constant mark-ups which
makes it less relevant for our analysis.
3Small (1997) calculates PCMs for UK manufacturing using industry level data. As
we discuss in more detail below, ﬁrm level data can be considered to be more appropriate
to study this issue. Griﬃth (2001) attempts to measure PCMs using observed data on
total output divided by total costs (assuming that AC = MC).
32M e t h o d o l o g y
The calculation of price cost margins is not straightforward as it is diﬃcult
to observe marginal costs. In the past, many studies used accounting data
on proﬁtability, or sales minus expenditures on labour and materials for the
calculation (see Tybout, 2001). However, Bresnahan (1987) argues forcefully
against the use of such accounting data on proﬁts as “there is no stable
time-series relationship between accounting proﬁt and price-cost margins in
the economic sense” (p. 460) due to the way in which diﬀerent accounting
practices deal with ﬁxed costs.
In order to avoid such issues, our methodology to calculate price cost
margins (PCMs) is based on Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). These papers
attempt to estimate Solow residuals under imperfect competition which, al-
most as a by-product, allows the estimation of PCMs.
To implement such an approach we start from a standard production
function
Qit = ΘitF(Kit,N it,M it)
where i is a ﬁrm index, t at i m ei n d e x ,Kit is capital stock (selected in advance
of the realisation of demand), Nit is labour input, Mit is material input and
Θit is the Hicks neutral technical progress. Assuming imperfect competition
in the ﬁnal goods market where ﬁrms set prices higher than marginal costs,
Hall (1988) and Domowitz et al. (1988) show that under constant returns to
scale the Solow residual (i.e., total factor productivity (TFP)) can be written
as
SR = ∆qit − αNit∆nit − αMit∆mit − (1 − αNit− αMit)∆kit
= βit(∆qit − ∆kit)+( 1− βit)ϑit (1)
where ∆xit are the growth rates (in log diﬀerences) of output (q), labour
(n), materials (m)a n dc a p i t a l( k), the αit are the shares of inputs in total
turnover (αJit = pJitJit/pitQit∀J = N,M)a n dϑit = ∆log(Θit) is the unob-
served productivity term.
The coeﬃcient βit is of special interest as it is equal to the price cot
m a r g i n ,o rL e r n e ri n d e x
βit =
pit − mcit
pit
=1−
1
µit
4which in turn allows one to retrieve the markup µit = pit/mcit.
Hall (1988) and Domowitz et al. (1988) suggest that µ can be retrieved
from estimating speciﬁcations of equation (1) and this approach has been
followed in a number of empirical studies (for example, Levinsohn, 1993,
Harrison, Konings et al., 2001). However, the problem with such an esti-
mation is that the explanatory variables are potentially correlated with the
unobserved productivity term ϑit. Hence, consistent estimation of equation
(1) relies on the use of suitable instruments for the right-hand-side variables,
which are potentially endogenous. The selection of proper instruments has,
however, turned out to be rather diﬃcult in practice.
Roeger (1995) discusses this problem in some detail and suggests an alter-
native approach that does not rely on ”the use of instruments that are very
hard to select” (p. 318). His proposed technique for estimating price-cost-
margins stems from his idea that the diﬀerence between the primal Solow
residual as described in equation (1) and its price-based dual (derived from
a cost function) is due to imperfect competition.
Hence, starting oﬀ with the primal Solow residual derived from the pro-
duction function as in equation (1) we can write a similar expression for the
price-based Solow residual (SRPit)
SRPit = αNit∆wit + αMit∆pMit+( 1− αNit− αMit)∆rit − ∆pit
= −βit (∆pit − ∆rit)+( 1− βit)ϑit (2)
where ∆wit, ∆pMit, ∆rit, ∆pit are the growth rates of the price for labour
(i.e., wage), materials, capital (i.e., rental rate for capital) and output. Sub-
tracting SRP from SR yields
SRit − SRPit = ∆qit + ∆pit − αNit(∆nit + ∆wit) − αMit(∆mit + ∆pMit)
−(1 − αNit− αMit)(∆kit + ∆rit)
= βit [(∆qit + ∆pit) − (∆kit + ∆rit)]
which cancels out the unobserved productivity term (1 − βit)ϑit. Rewrit-
ing the left hand side as ∆y and the right hand side as ∆x and adding a
random error term uit yields:
∆yit = βit∆xit + uit (3)
Roeger (1995) argues that this expression can be estimated using OLS
because the error term in this case is not correlated with the regressor, i.e.,
5there is no endogeneity problem. Hence, there is no need to use instrumental
variables. Equation (3) is the key equation to be estimated.
As discussed extensively by Roeger (1995) pp. 321-324, there are a variety
of reasons why the error term should not be identical to zero for all i and
all t. In particular, in the case of excess capacity and labor hoarding, the
diﬀerence between the primal and the dual Solow residual is cyclical, which
would be captured by the error term. We use year dummies to capture
potential demand eﬀects. However, Roeger ﬁnds that the goodness of ﬁt
is relatively high, and that adding conjectural factors does not add much
explanatory power.
To make our analysis econometrically feasible, we need to impose some
identifying restrictions. It is not possible to estimate price-cost margins
for each ﬁrm separately using this approach. We have at our disposal a ﬁrm
level panel dataset. Therefore, we can estimate β for a given time period (βt)
assuming that price-cost margins are the same for all ﬁr m si nag i v e ny e a r ,f o r
a given industry
³
βj
´
assuming PCMs to be identical for all ﬁrms within the
same sector, or for a given period and a given industry
³
βjt
´
. This technique
allows much more ﬂexibility than what has been used in the literature thus
far as we can estimate the evolution of mark-ups over time by sector and
therefore capture more of the heterogeneity present in our sample.
A number of issues arise when estimating price-cost-margins using this
approach. First, there is the question of whether to use ﬁrm or industry level
data to estimate the above equations. Clearly, the empirical methodology
i sb a s e do nam o d e lo fﬁrm behaviour and, therefore, ﬁrm level data should
be most appropriate to estimate the model. However, the literature has
mostly used industry level data (see Hall, 1988, Roeger, 1998). As is well
known, industry level data may lead to biased results as they aggregate over
potentially heterogenous units. Our dataset provides us with ﬁrm level data
for UK manufacturing industries which are arguably more appropriate for
such an analysis.4
Second, it is diﬃcult to believe that the degree of market power has re-
mained constant over time. Nevertheless, most studies estimate the average
markup over a period. Exceptions are studies using ﬁrm level data with a
smaller time span and/or trying to capture structural adjustments (Levin-
4See also Konings and Vandenbussche (2002) for a recent application of this method
using ﬁrm level data. They analyse the eﬀect of antidumping protection on price cost
margins of European ﬁrms.
6sohn, 1993; Konings et al., 2001) and sector studies trying to control for
changes in some exogenous parameters like trade (Hakura, 1998) or the na-
ture of antitrust control (Warzynski, 2001). We allow for changes in mark-ups
over time in the estimations of equation (3).
Third, we can also look more closely at some ﬁrm level characteristics that
might be associated with higher price cost margins. As pointed out above,
the main aim of the paper is to analyse whether exporting activity impacts on
price cost margins. To do this, reconsider equation (3) and assume that the
coeﬃcient βit is made up of two components, capturing the average mark-up
for non-exporters plus a term allowing for a diﬀerence in mark-ups between
exporters and non-exporters, i.e.,
βit =( β1 + β2 ∗ EDit)
where EDit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is an exporter. We can
estimate these two components of the mark-up by substituting this expression
back into equation (3) and re-arranging, which yields
∆yit = β1∆xit + β2EDit ∗ ∆xit + uit (4)
If exporters indeed have diﬀerent price-cost margins we would expect β2
to be statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Similarly, we investigate whether export intensity aﬀects price cost mar-
gins by estimating the following equation
∆yit = β3∆xit + β4EIit ∗ ∆xit + vit (5)
for all ﬁr m sa sw e l la sf o re x p o r t i n gﬁrms only, where EIit is a ﬁrm’s
export intensity deﬁned as exports over total turnover. Again, if exporting
activity matters we would expect β4 to be statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
It is worth noting that, while the derivations of the dual Solow residual as-
sumes constant markup, it is straightforward to relax this assumption, adding
necessary controls, as shown by Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (2002).
Finally, what we are testing is the joint hypothesis of perfect competition
and constant returns to scale (see also Basu and Fernald, 1997 p. 253).
While the Hall approach allows the joint estimation of both parameters, this
estimation is more complicated with the Roeger approach.
73 Dataset
The analysis is based on company level data taken from the OneSource
database which is compiled by OneSource Information Services Ltd.5 The
OneSource database is a subset of all actively trading companies which are
legally required to deposit company accounts data at Companies House. It
includes information on the top 110,000 private and public companies in all
industries (not just manufacturing) in the United Kingdom. Speciﬁcally,
the data include (i) all plcs, (ii) all companies with employment greater than
50, (iii) the top companies based on turnover, net worth, total assets, or
shareholders’ funds (whichever is the largest), up to a maximum of 110,000
companies (Hart and Oulton, 1995).
This dataset is particularly suitable for our purposes as it is one of the few
datasets to contain recent ﬁrm level data on exports.6 Also, it provides recent
ﬁrm level data on, inter alia, output, employment, physical capital, wages
and accounting data in a consistent way across ﬁrms in the UK. Furthermore,
it has a time series element allowing investigation of the development of price
cost margins over time. The data available to us cover the period 1990 to
1996.
Since the purpose of this study is to look at the relationship between
exporting and price-cost margins we focus on private manufacturing ﬁrms
only, dropping all public or non-manufacturing ﬁrms from the sample. We
also drop ﬁrms that were ultimate holding companies or subsidiaries under
joint ownership,7 ﬁrms that have average employment or turnover levels of
zero, or growth rates for wages or turnover of more than 200 percent or less
than -200 percent in the data, and ﬁrms for which the ownership indicator
(which indicates whether the ﬁrm is private/public owned, whether it is
independent etc) is missing. Furthermore, in order to mitigate the impact
of outliers in the regressions we excluded the top and bottom 5 percentile
observations in terms of ∆yit and ∆xit.
5We used the OneSource CD-ROM entitled ”UK Companies, Vol. 1” for May 1998.
See, for example, Girma et al. (2003) and Hart and Oulton (1996) for other papers
using other vintages of the same database. Hart and Oulton (1995) provide a thorough
description and discussion of the dataset.
6Note that micro level data on exporting are not available in the ARD database, the
micro-level database provided by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK.
7These were dropped as it may lead to double counting if ﬁrms have consolidated
accounts.
8After these operations our dataset contains information on 5,834 ﬁrms.
The median number of observations per ﬁrm is 4. The mean employment in
these ﬁrms over the total period is 329, with the median being 97 employees.
2,644 ﬁrms enter and there are 2,395 exits from the sample over the period
analysed. Of the ﬁrms included in the sample, 2,410 are exporters throughout
the sample period, 2,659 never export and the remaining 765 exported in at
least one year during the sample period.
For the discussion of the variables included in the empirical estimation it
is useful to rewrite equation (3) as follows
∆logORit − αNit∆logCEit − αMit∆logCMit
−αKit(∆logNKit + ∆logRit)( 6 )
= βit [∆logORit − (∆logNKit + ∆logRit)]
OR is operating revenue, CE is total cost of employees, CM is total cost
of materials and NK is tangible ﬁxed assets net of depreciation. All of
these variables are available at the ﬁrm level from our dataset. Note that all
variables are speciﬁed in nominal terms which is a further advantage of the
Roeger method compared to others. Rit i st h eu s e rc o s to fc a p i t a l ,d e ﬁned
as (see, for example, Hsieh, 2002)
Rit = PI (r + δit)
where δit is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc rate of depreciation on capital assets, avail-
able from the dataset. PI is the index of investment goods prices and r is
the real interest rate. PI and r are at the country level and time varying.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the growth rates of operating
proﬁts, capital stock, total cost of employees and cost of materials for 1996.
Note that, in all cases, the growth rates are higher for non-exporters than
for exporters, although this diﬀerence is only statistically signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level in the case of the growth of operating revenue and cost of
employees.
[Table 1 here]
94 Econometric Results
As pointed out above, our analysis is based on ﬁrm level panel data for UK
manufacturing industries. Since equations (3) to (6) are essentially twice
diﬀerenced equations any possible ﬁrm speciﬁc unobservable eﬀects that may
impact on a ﬁrm’s production function are cancelled out. Hence we can use
simple pooled regression techniques for the estimation.8 We allow for het-
eroskedasticity of the error term, as well as an unspeciﬁed correlation between
error terms within establishments, but not across establishments. This al-
lows for the likely possibility that error terms within ﬁrms are correlated over
time.
4.1 Average price cost margins
We start with estimating equation (3) for the entire sample in order to provide
a baseline of the average PCM in UK manufacturing ﬁrms. The results
are reported in column (1) of Table 2. We report the coeﬃcients of βit
estimated from the regressions and the implied value of the mark-up µit.T h e
estimates of the Lerner index βit are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, suggesting the existence of market power and, hence, deviations from
perfect competition in UK manufacturing industries. The average mark-up
is 1.12 which is well within the range of estimates provided by Small (1997)
for a number of UK manufacturing industries.
This estimation imposes the constraint that the average PCM is constant
over time. In order to relax this assumption we constructed interaction terms
of year dummies with ∆xit which are included in equation (3). Inclusion
of the time interaction terms, i.e., allowing for changes in PCM over time in
column (2) indicates a reduction in the average PCM for all years relative
to 1990. While the focus of our paper is not on explaining the evolution of
mark-ups over time, we note that this ﬁnding is in line with Griﬃth (2001)
who argues that the European Single Market Programme, which became
eﬀe c t i v ei n1 9 9 2 ,l e dt oa ni n c r e a s ei np r o d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o ni nt h e
UK. Note that, in all speciﬁcations, we can reject the hypothesis that the
interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. Hence the speciﬁcation in column
(2) should be preferred to column (1).
8We also replicated all estimations using a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. In the majority of
cases, a simple F test of the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect rejects the speciﬁcation,
hence we prefer the pooled estimations as used here.
10These estimations, of course, average over a number of heterogeneous
sub-sectors. In order to ﬁnd more homogeneous comparison groups we es-
t i m a t e de q u a t i o n( 3 )s e p a r a t e l yf o rﬁrms in diﬀerentiated and homogeneous
good producing industries.9 As is well known, a ﬁrm’s mark-up is aﬀected
by the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Hence, grouping ﬁrms together ac-
cording to the level of product diﬀerentiation appears a reasonable empirical
strategy.
T h er e s u l t so ft h ee s t i m a t i o n sf o rt h et w og r o u p so fﬁrms separately are
reported in columns (3) to (6). We ﬁnd diﬀerences in the average PCM be-
tween diﬀerentiated and homogeneous good producing industries. In order
to check whether these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant we estimated
the model on the whole sample including interaction terms of all variables
w i t had u m m ye q u a lt oo n ei ft h eﬁrm is in a diﬀerentiated good industry.
Without including the year interaction terms, the interaction term for ∆xit
with the dummy is individually statistically signiﬁcant (at the six percent
level) suggesting a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in PCMs between diﬀerentiated and
homogeneous goods producing industries. When including the time inter-
action terms, the coeﬃcient is no longer statistically signiﬁcant, however.10
This suggests that PCMs in the two diﬀerent subsets of ﬁrms have followed
diﬀerent evolutions.
[Table 2 here]
4.2 The eﬀect of exporting behaviour
We now turn to the issue of whether exporting aﬀects price-cost margins for
those ﬁrms who do export. The ﬁrst step is to estimate the simple premia
to exporting, as described in equation (4). Note that with our approach all
we can establish is whether or not there is a correlation between exporting
and price-cost margins, we are agnostic about the causality of such possible
eﬀects.11
The result of this estimation for the whole manufacturing sector is pre-
sented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. Note that the average Lerner
9This distinction is based on a classiﬁcation of industries used by Rauch (1999); details
can be found in the appendix.
10The t- and F- values for these tests are not reported here but can be obtained from
the authors. We also carried out similar tests for the results on exporting reported below.
11Bernard et al. (2003) also do not establish a causal link between exporting and price
cost margins in their theoretical model.
11index is still positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The inclusion of the ex-
port dummy only leads to a marginal chan g ei nc o m p a r i s o nt ot h ee s t i m a t e s
presented in the preferred speciﬁcation in column (2) of Table 2. The pos-
itive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the export interaction term
(EDit ∗ ∆xit) suggests that exporters have, on average, higher price cost
margins than non-exporters. This is consistent with the theory discussed
a b o v e ,w h e r em o r ee ﬃcient ﬁrms are more likely to export and have higher
mark-ups. Based on the preferred speciﬁcation in column (2), we ﬁnd that
exporters have an average mark-up that is about 1.2 percent higher than
that for non-exporters.
In order to investigate diﬀerences across broad industries we again break
up the total sample into the diﬀerentiated and homogeneous goods groups.
For diﬀerentiated goods industries we ﬁnd a positive export premium. Tak-
ing the point estimates at face value, we ﬁnd that the mark-up for exporters
in these industries is about 2.5 percent higher than that for non-exporters.
For homogeneous good industries, however, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between exporters and non-exporters in terms of their PCMs.
Again we checked whether the export premia are statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods sectors by estimat-
ing the model on the whole sample and including interaction terms of all
variables with a diﬀerentiated good industry dummy. The coeﬃcient on the
export dummy interaction term is individually statistically signiﬁcant, and
all interaction terms are jointly statistically signiﬁcant also.
This diﬀerence is probably what one would expect. In diﬀerentiated
goods industries, ﬁrms can add a further dimension to product diﬀerentia-
tion by exporting (i.e., diﬀerentiate geographically). This may then lead to
exporters being able to increase their price cost margins through this further
diﬀerentiation. This is not possible for exporters which sell homogeneous
goods abroad as these are homogeneous on both domestic and foreign mar-
kets.
[Table 3 here]
A further question to ask is whether the extent of exporting activity is also
related with the mark-ups ﬁrms charge. When we use the export intensity
instead of the export dummy and interact with ∆x,w eﬁnd results similar
to those found in the speciﬁcation with the export dummy, as reported in
Table 4.
12[Table 4 here]
However, it may be more interesting to ask what the impact of the ex-
porting intensity is conditional on the ﬁrm being an exporter.I n o r d e r t o
address this point we estimate equation (5) using data on only ﬁrms that are
exporters at any given time during the sample period.12 T h er e s u l t sa r er e -
ported in Table (5). The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms EIit∗∆xit are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant only for the case of homogeneous goods
industries. However, performing a test as above by interacting all variables
with a dummy for diﬀerentiated goods industries, we ﬁnd that we cannot re-
ject the hypothesis that the interaction term of EIit ∗∆xit with the dummy
is equal to zero. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that these interaction terms are not
jointly statistically signiﬁcant in either of the two speciﬁcations. Hence, we
cannot conclude that there are any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the impact of
exporting intensity on PCMs across these two sectoral groupings.
[Table 5 here]
Taken together, these results indicate that there is a diﬀerence between
homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods industries in terms of exporting only
as far as the distinction between exporter - non-exporter is concerned. For
ﬁrms in the diﬀerentiated goods industries it is important whether or not
they are exporters in terms of their price cost margin, while there is no such
eﬀect apparent for ﬁrms in homogeneous goods industries.
We also carried on our analysis using more disaggregated subsets of ﬁrms
(2-digit NACE Rev.1) and our main results held on. We observed more
heterogeneity by sector but we also noticed a diﬀerence depending on whether
the sector was producing diﬀerentiated or homogeneous goods. The eﬀects of
exporting activity and exporting intensity were also in line with the results
s h o w ni nt h i ss e c t i o n .
12This sub-sample thus includes ﬁrms that enter and exit over the sample period. While
we do not deal with the issue of entry and exit explicitly we also experimented using data
for cohorts of entrants into exporting only. However, no clear-cut results were obtained
and we therefore report the results for all exporters here.
135 Summary and conclusions
There exists a sizeable literature analysing the eﬀect of import competition
on domestic mark-ups. Our paper examines the trade - competition link from
ad i ﬀerent point of view by investigating whether exporting activity is related
to ﬁrms’ price cost margins. Our paper is related to the recent literature on
exporting and productivity, which shows that exporters on average are more
eﬃcient than non-exporters. Based on a model by Bernard et al. (2003) one
may expect ﬁrms that are more eﬃcient to charge higher mark-ups and to be
more likely to become exporters. We investigate this issue using company
level data for UK manufacturing industries. The measurement of mark-ups
follows the recent approach presented by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). Our
econometric results show that, on average, exporters have higher mark-ups
than non-exporters. Based on the classiﬁcation by Rauch (1999) we also
distinguish sectors into homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods producing.
This distinction shows that we only ﬁnd higher mark-ups for exporters in
diﬀerentiated goods sectors, not in homogeneous sectors.
6 Appendix
The distinction of industries into diﬀerentiated and homogeneous goods pro-
ducing industries is based on Rauch (1999). The details of his classiﬁca-
tion which is based on the SITC Rev. 2 sectoral deﬁnition are described at
http://weber.ucsd.edu/˜jrauch/intltrad/. Rauch distinguishes commodities
into three groups: those trade on organised exchanges, those which are ref-
erence priced, and others, which are diﬀerentiated goods. For our purposes
we amalgamate the ﬁrst two categories into a group “homogeneous goods”.
We use the “conservative” aggregation used by Rauch.13 We used the three
to four digit sectoral classiﬁcation used by Rauch and matched this to three
to four digit UK SIC 1992 sectors.
13It turned out that the “conservative” and “liberal” classiﬁcations used by Rauch did
not appear to be very diﬀerent once we amalgamated referenced priced and organised
exchange goods into one group.
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17Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for 1996
Non-exporters Exporters t-stat
mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev.
∆ logPQ 0.089 0.192 0.077 0.201 2.019
∆ logK 0.039 0.333 0.037 0.300 0.180
∆ logWN 0.086 0.183 0.067 0.169 3.644
∆ logPMM 0.093 0.219 0.080 0.227 1.891
Table 2: Average price cost margins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all differentiated differentiated homogeneous homogeneous
xit 0.104 0.127 0.102 0.129 0.108 0.126
(0.001)** (0.005)** (0.002)** (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.007)**
Implied µ 1.116 1.145 1.114 1.148 1.121 1.144
xit * D91 -0.021 -0.027 -0.013
(0.006)** (0.008)** (0.009)
xit * D92 -0.030 -0.033 -0.026
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.008)**
xit * D93 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028
(0.006)** (0.008)** (0.009)**
xit * D94 -0.024 -0.027 -0.019
(0.005)** (0.007)** (0.008)*
xit * D95 -0.021 -0.027 -0.012
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.008)
xit * D96 -0.028 -0.033 -0.019
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.008)*
Observations 23238 23238 13656 13656 9582 9582
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.27
F (interaction) 5.88** 4.08** 2.44*
Heteroskedasticity – autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
F-test for joint significance of time interaction terms
Regression includes constant termTable 3: Exporting premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all differentiated differentiated homogeneous homogeneous
xit  0.095 0.119 0.083 0.109 0.106 0.129
(0.004)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.009)** (0.005)** (0.010)**
xit * ED 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.021 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004)* (0.004)* (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006) (0.006)
Implied µ
For non-
exporters
1.105 1.135 1.091 1.122 1.119 1.148
For exporters 1.116 1.147 1.116 1.149 1.117 1.145
xit * D91 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022
(0.008)** (0.010)* (0.012)
xit * D92 -0.027 -0.025 -0.031
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.011)**
xit * D93 -0.033 -0.034 -0.035
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.011)**
xit * D94 -0.021 -0.024 -0.018
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)
xit * D95 -0.021 -0.024 -0.016
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)
xit * D96 -0.030 -0.034 -0.024
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.011)*
Observations 15207 15207 9322 9322 5885 5885
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25
F (interaction) 4.47** 3.00** 2.08*
Heteroskedasticity – autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
F-test for joint significance of time interaction terms
Regression includes constant termTable 4: Effect of exporting intensity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all diff diff hom hom
xit  0.098 0.121 0.094 0.120 0.101 0.123
(0.002)** (0.006)** (0.003)** (0.007)** (0.004)** (0.009)**
xit * EI 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.025
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.014) (0.014)
xit * D91 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(0.008)** (0.010)* (0.012)
xit * D92 -0.028 -0.025 -0.032
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.011)**
xit * D93 -0.034 -0.033 -0.035
(0.007)** (0.010)** (0.011)**
xit * D94 -0.021 -0.024 -0.017
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)
xit * D95 -0.021 -0.025 -0.016
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)
xit * D96 -0.030 -0.035 -0.024
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.011)*
Observations 15207 15207 9322 9322 5885 5885
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25
F (interaction) 4.50** 2.96** 2.09*
Heteroskedasticity – autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
F-test for joint significance of time interaction terms
Regression includes constant term
Table 5: Effect of exporting intensity (only exporters)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all diff diff hom hom
xit  0.099 0.122 0.100 0.123 0.097 0.120
(0.003)** (0.006)** (0.004)** (0.008)** (0.005)** (0.010)**
xit * EI 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.014 0.033 0.037
(0.008)* (0.008)* (0.010) (0.010) (0.016)* (0.016)*
xit * D91 -0.018 -0.020 -0.013
(0.008)* (0.010) (0.014)
xit * D92 -0.027 -0.021 -0.040
(0.008)** (0.010)* (0.013)**
xit * D93 -0.034 -0.036 -0.030
(0.008)** (0.010)** (0.013)*
xit * D94 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023
(0.007)** (0.009)* (0.012)
xit * D95 -0.021 -0.019 -0.025
(0.008)** (0.010)* (0.012)*
xit * D96 -0.030 -0.033 -0.025
(0.008)** (0.009)** (0.012)*
Observations 11781 11781 7693 7693 4088 4088
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
F (interaction) 3.82** 2.76** 2.01
Heteroskedasticity – autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
F-test for joint significance of time interaction terms
Regression includes constant term